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Abstract
International investors’ interest in the capital markets in the region of Gulf countries
has dramatically increased in last two decades. Thus, it would be motivating to investigate their characteristics, where the January anomaly is a major one. This paper
studies the veracity of the January effect rule in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
stock markets and examines the predictive power of January returns. Seven GCC stock
markets are tested – the market indices in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia – from January 1, 2001 until December 31, 2018, a timeframe
which has rarely been analyzed. Ordinary least square (OLS)-based dummy variable
regression equation was used as the conventional econometric procedure in the works
of financial calendar anomalies in stock markets. Some evidence is reported for the
markets of Dubai and Kuwait. The paper also provides an additional explanation for
the performance of stock market of Kuwait. The findings are opposite to the well documented evidence that emerging markets are less efficient and hence it is likely that
several market anomalies are further pronounced. The results suggest that the predictive power of the January anomaly can be considered as a temporary anomaly in the
GCC markets, since it is concentrated in only a couple of GCC markets and does not
persist in time.

Keywords

calendar anomalies, January barometer, other January
effect, Halloween effect, GCC

JEL Classification

G10, G14, G15

INTRODUCTION
There are many market anomalies distinguished and reported in
the stock market literature. Calendar effects in stock market returns
have confused financial economists since the mid-70s (e.g., Mills,
Siriopoulos, Markellos, & Harizanis, 2000). Some of the stock market
seasonality’s are relatively easy to identify, reliable and testable data
are supplied, and to have knowledge about their statistical significance
might be of importance for analysts, traders, portfolio managers and
news observers and reporters. In particular, “January effect”, which is
a pattern that the mean return of stocks is higher in January, has been
one of the most investigated topics in market finance, since Kinney
and Rozeff (1976) reported evidence that stocks in general generate
statistically significant higher returns in January comparing to the remaining other months during the year.
January has a significant amazing notoriety on Wall Street as a deluge
of money structure year-end rewards, and yearly assignments commonly drive stocks higher. We have seen many research subjects on
such abnormalities in the US and the major European markets, but few
in emerging markets. It is expected that many well-recognized stock
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market anomalies are not present in the emerging stock exchanges, thus, developing markets provide
an interesting “out of sample” test profit-generating calendar effects of calendar anomalies (Claessens,
Dooley, & Warner, 1995). Nevertheless, this sort of study has been seldom inspected inside the Middle
East, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Their market capitalization to GDP are
comparable to that of other emerging markets, although they vary significantly in the degree of foreign
investors participation (the UAE has the highest participation of foreign investors and Saudi Arabia is
the lowest, but the largest equity market in the Arab world). Although GCC groups together six of the
world’s wealthiest nations, have functioning stock markets open to foreign investors, and some of them
having graduated into the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) emerging markets category,
they are still not studied enough. This is because in the past, these markets turned out to be generally
ignored by international investors due to imposed limitations and other restrictions on foreign stock
ownership, the absence of common accounting and reporting standards and corporate transparency or
based on the political uncertainty and economic turbulence at the end of the first decade of 2000 and/
or due to the difficulty of obtaining adequate and consistent market data.
Given the increasing importance of financial and trade relationships between GCC and advanced economies, and the increased interest of international investors in these markets nowadays, it would be reasonable to study the characteristics of these markets, where the January anomaly is a major one. This
paper studies the other January effect (OJE) and its variations in the small emerging markets of the GCC
region. The paper applies ordinary least square (OLS)-based dummy variable regression equation as
the conventional methodology in the literature of anomalies (Arshad & Coutts, 1997; Mills et al., 2000),
although several econometric techniques have been applied over time (Harshita, Singh, & Yadav, 2019)
with mixed results. In our analysis, the January effect is not evidenced in the Arab countries of the Gulf,
except for Dubai and Kuwait. Since this paper finds that the OJE is concentrated in only a couple of
GCC markets and does not persist in time, it can be considered as a temporary anomaly (Schwert, 2002;
Stivers, L. Sun, & Y. Sun, 2009).
Although various explanations for the January effect have been considered in the literature, no final
clarification has been given to distinguish a particular explanation from others (Dodd & Gakhovich,
2011; Chen, 2012). Because calendar anomalies in stock markets appear quite easy and low cost to exploit, their sustained existence seems incomprehensible. In fact, there are no unanimously recognized
interpretations for calendar anomalies such as the January effect, and a number of factors are contributing: sample selection, data mining, measurement errors, alterations in settlement time of transactions,
taxation, small-cap stocks, riskiness of the stock, company type, bid-ask spread and thin trading. A
related statistical interpretation for the January effect is commonly referred to as the “data-snooping
hypothesis” (Haug & Hirschey, 2006), according to which much, if not all, of the January effect may be a
statistical artifact linked with the investment selection on a specific calendar period. On the other hand,
there are periods of calendar time when the investors’ behavior changes significantly. To give some examples, as noted in Mills et al. (2000), “we can have a change in the mean, the variance, the skewness,
or the kurtosis of the returns’ distribution, only for the periods the effect is observed.” Besides it might
be the case that a calendar anomaly is simply the effect of another’s calendar anomaly (Jacobs & Levy,
1988) in disguise. Thus, the interaction of different calendar anomalies extends the set of possible explanations. In this paper, the interaction of the other January effect with the Halloween effect is also investigated. In the paper, the evidence that for the stock exchanges of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia Halloween
effect is an explanation of the OJE is reported.
Overall, the empirical findings do not allow us to support the OJE in the GCC region, although regularities are observed for a couple of countries. The results of this paper are opposite to the well-documented
evidence that smaller markets are best candidates for market anomalies and seasonality is due to their
informational inefficiency. In contrast, the findings provide additional evidence that January effect does
not exist anymore in stock return (Patel, 2015), but are in accordance with the study of Al-Saad (2004)
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who reported the January effect in the Kuwait stock market and concluded that taxes are not the fundamental source of seasonality.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section a literature review of the January effect with
the focus in the GCC stock exchanges is presented. In section 2, model specifications are developed and
a discussion of the empirical findings in GCC markets is offered. The paper concludes in the last section
along with the main findings and directions for future research.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW
The OJE was first discovered for the US by Hirsch
(1972) and labeled the “January barometer” (JB).
Hirsch and Hirsch (2007) report a 91.1% accuracy ratio for this barometer for S&P 500 data since
1950 and explain this phenomenon by major political events that occur in January as being responsible for its presence. Fuller (1978) examined the JB
in comparison with the 5-day hypothesis for the
years 1929–1977 and found that for both DJIA and
S&P500, the JB correctly forecasted 81% of cases
compared to 78% for the 5-day rule. By studying
various periods, he showed that JB is just slightly better at forecasting full-year returns than the
5-day rule, but he concluded that both theories do
not help in implanting a profitable trading strategy.
Bloch and Pupp (1983) examined two different versions of the January predictive hypothesis for the
period 1950–1982 and provided evidence against
the hypothesis. Brown and Luo (2006), using the
data between 1941 and 2002, tested three different
variations of the January barometer hypothesis and
concluded that January clearly is worth in forecasting the next twelve months than any other month
of the year. Fuller (1978) calculated the returns of
the remaining 11 months, while Brown and Luo
(2006) have considered the next 12-month period.
Recently, Cooper, Mcconnell, and Ovtchinnikov
(2006) confirmed the wisdom “as goes January, so
goes the year” in the US stock market for the period 1940–2003 and found that macroeconomic/
business cycle variables did not explain OJE nor is
caused by the presidential cycle. In a recent paper,
however, Darrat, Li, and Chung (2013) showed that
the OJE disappears in the US market once they expand the period from 1926 to 2012. Bohl and Salm
(2010) and not provide evidence of the OJE in 18
international capital markets.

is “tax-loss-selling hypothesis”, first proposed in
1942 by Wachtel (“stocks rose in January as investors began buying again after the year-end tax-induced sell-off”). According to a similar hypothesis for the January effect, namely the “new-year
resolution hypothesis”, people restructure their
portfolios and habits in December or January
(Ritter, 1988), and their plans or investment decisions are implemented in January and, as a result,
January prices go up. Both hypotheses state that
stock prices experience a drop at the year-end as
a result of investors’ realizing losses or comprehending year-end bonuses to reduce their tax, and
then return to equilibrium levels after year-end,
leading to an abnormally high return in January.
Hence, the January effect should not exist in countries where there is no capital gains tax, or the tax
year does not start in January. January effect is
also less pronounced as many investors now use
tax-protected retirement schemes like IRAs and
401(k). However, Al-Saad (2004) studied the OJE
in the Kuwait Stock Exchange and concluded that
taxation is not the reason for the appearance of
the January effect. The findings of this paper also
support the existence of OJE in the Kuwait Stock
Exchange for the period from January 2001 to
December 2018.

Wachtel (1942) advanced an alternative January effect, the “Santa Claus effect,” and supported the
hypothesis that the unusual demand for cash for
the holiday season affects the investors to sell the
stocks in December, which is consistent with the
increasing sales during December. Then, prices
are expected to rise in January. Recently, Washer,
Nippani, and Johnson (2016) show that Santa Claus
Rally exists for a long period of time (1916–2014)
in the USA. Another explanation discussed is the
“window dressing hypothesis”: at the end of each
year, portfolio managers and other institutional
The reasons for January effect have been discussed investors liquidate losing positions and show onby many researchers and the most popular one ly profitable stocks in their portfolios to attract
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changes significantly. To give some examples,
we can have a change in the mean, the variance,
the skewness, or the kurtosis of the returns’ distribution, only for the periods the effect is observed (Mills et al., 2000). Besides, it might be
the case that a calendar anomaly is simply the
effect of another’s calendar anomaly (Jacobs &
Levy, 1988) in disguise. Thus, the interaction
of different calendar anomalies extends the set
Yet, another January anomaly is also related to of possible explanations. In this paper, the in“January barometer” and the “5-day rule” and both teraction of the other January effect with the
confirm the January effect. Hence, January market Halloween effect is also investigated. The paper
anomaly is also used in the literature under oth- provides evidence that for the stock exchanges
er cases known as other January effects (Cooper, of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Halloween effect is
Mcconnell, & Ovtchinnikov, 2006). January re- an explanation of the OJE.
turns (first five days of January) specify the return
of the remaining months and/or year’s return. Because of the difficulty of obtaining enough
This is sometimes called the “January predictor” and adequate stock market data, no attention
or “January barometer” (“5-day rule”). This paper has been paid by researchers to these markets.
investigates January barometer hypothesis in the Therefore, the sporadic research on GCC finanGCC region for the period from January 2001 to cial markets was conducted on either individDecember 2018. Based on the empirical results of ual stock exchanges or a limited set of capital
the paper, one cannot support that the January ef- markets of the Middle East and North African
fect does seem to be a GCC regional phenome- (MENA) region (for instance, Bley & Chen,
non, with two-three exceptions, thus, confirming 2006; Zarour, 2006; Zarour, 2007; Zarour &
Claessens et al.’s (1995) argument that the famil- Siriopoulos, 2008; Chaffai & Medhioub, 2018).
iar stock market anomalies are not present in the The efficiency of GCC financial markets was
emerging capital markets.
investigated earlier, and the results of previous
studies indicated the support of market ineffiAlthough various explanations for the January ciency. GCC stock markets are characterized
effect have been considered in the literature, no by various trades with different time horizon
final clarification has been given to distinguish strategies, and various information flows due to
a particular explanation from others (Dodd & the high concentration of the markets. Yet, ecoGakhovich, 2011; Chen, 2012). Because calendar nomic structural changes, ongoing regulatory
anomalies appear relatively easy and low cost reforms, and market liberalization in the GCC
to exploit, their continued (in-) existence seems economies have an impact on investors’ portfoinexplicable. In fact, there are no universally lio choice for diversification purposes, leading
accepted explanations for calendar anomalies to boosted market capitalization, average daily
such as the January effect, and a number of fac- turnover, and IPO activity, since 2002 (PWC,
tors have been found as potential contributors: 2019).
sample selection, data mining, measurement
errors, differences in settlement time of trans- So now investors have a greater interest in diveractions, taxes, small-cap stocks, riskiness of the sifying their portfolios to these markets, and instock, company type, bid-ask spread and thin vestigating the distinguished characteristics of
trading. A related statistical explanation for the these markets is highly worthy, as market anomJanuary effect is commonly referred to as the alies affect the trading and portfolio decisions.
“data-snooping hypothesis” (Haug & Hirschey, Bulter and Malikah (1992) studied the efficiency
2006), according to which much, if not all, of the of Saudi and Kuwaiti stock markets for the periJanuary effect may be a statistical artifact tied to od 1985–1989. Other studies refer to Saudi Arabia
investment period selection. On the other hand, market (Nourredine, 1998), UAE (Ebid, 1990) or
there are periods when the investors’ behavior some MENA countries (Zarour, 2006, 2007). This
more investors. Then, in January small-cap, riskier stocks with the hope of making a profit, thus,
raising the January prices (Haugen & Lakonishok,
1988). However, in a recent study, Patel (2012) offers the evidence from the US stock market that
small firms did not generate significantly higher
returns in January over the remaining months of
the year.

64

http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.16(4).2019.06

Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 16, Issue 4, 2019

is due to the stock markets in the GCC being rath- pects, for example, they will dismiss the producer small, and listed companies are few and most tive market speculation.
stocks are occasionally traded, with a low trading
activity.

2. MODEL SPECIFICATIONS

To conclude this short review of January anomAND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
aly, it is important to note the implications for
the efficient market hypothesis, which infers that The data are composed of daily closing values of
stock returns are unpredictable. In the presence the major indices of the seven Gulf regions, which
of a calendar anomaly, different methods may include indices representing the GCC. According
improve the out-of-sample forecasting ability. to data from Bloomberg, the length of the time
However, this is not proof of market inefficien- series varies from country to country and from
cy, but evidence that market efficiency, like all index to index. For instance, KWSEIDX (Kuwait),
theories, is fundamentally flawed (Ball, 1994). If MSM30 (Oman), DSM (Qatar) and SASEIDX
a time series is not affected by a calendar regu- (Saudi Arabia) have longer time series than the
larity at all, the forecasting is not ameliorated other markets, by which their data start from
much (Aly, Mehdian, & Perry, 2004; Leontitsis & 2001, whereas ADSMI (Abu Dhabi) starts from
Siriopoulos, 2006a, b). This is in favor of the con- 2002, DFM (Dubai) and BHSEASI (Bahrain) start
cept that once a market’s anomaly effect becomes from 2004.
widely acknowledged, then, excess risk-adjusted returns disappear, which is supported by the The analysis was performed using the entire
market efficiency theory. An additional area of data set for each index. Monthly returns were
interest is the interaction of different calendar calculated using daily closing prices. The data
anomalies, addressed by Jacobs and Levy (1988), were then grouped by month (from January to
which extends the set of possible explanations for December).
a market anomaly. Hence, possibly, the effect of
Closing value (T )
a particular calendar anomaly may be simply the
=
Daily Return (T )
− 1. (1)
effect of another’s calendar anomaly in disguise.
Closing value (T − 1)
In this paper, it is also investigated whether the
OJE is simply the Halloween effect (“sell in May The monthly return was calculated by using the
and go away,” advanced by Bouman & Jacobsen, daily return for the months of December and
2002) in disguise. Empirical evidence that for January, was captured by using the first day of the
the stock exchanges of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, month and the last day of the same month1.
Halloween effect is an explanation of the OJE is
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the inconveyed.
dices studied. The stock markets of Dubai, Kuwait,
In this paper, we explore the possible presence Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia have negative
of the January barometer in a sample of the Gulf skewness. Literature documents that aggregate
Cooperation Council (GCC) stock markets of stock market returns exhibit asymmetric volaSaudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Kuwait, Bahrain, tility, which explains the propensity for volatility
Oman, and Qatar. The analysis of these financial in these markets to exhibit negative returns with
markets is based on daily returns of their biggest greater probability than the one suggested by the
respective indices during the timeframe from normal distribution (see also Figure 1 after 2008).
January 1, 2001 until December 31, 2018, which is
a timeframe not well covered in previous research. This effect leads to an increase of the required
Due to the GCC and its creating status, it very well risk premia and it might clarify the low returns
may be normal, given the past writing, that prob- of these markets. The markets of Oman and Abu
ably a portion of the broke down business sectors Dhabi are riskier and Bahrain stock market exhibwill demonstrate a specific measure of wasteful as- its the lowest risk.
1

All data were extracted from Bloomberg terminal from the year the index was listed. Some of the indices were not listed on the terminal
before 2004, such as Bahrain and Dubai. Therefore, there are no data in Table 1 before the mentioned year.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Statistical measures
Mean
Standard error
Median
Mode
Standard deviation
Sample variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence level (95%)

ADSM

DFMGI

KWSEIDX

DSM

BHSEASI

MSM30

SASEIDX

0.015043921
0.007165261
0.009502942
N/A
0.1023404
0.010473558
90.0651084
7.843134906
1.400208238
–0.197388181
1.202820056
3.068959933
204
0.014127881

0.00325
0.007049
–0.00324
–0.0064
0.094568
0.008943
2.642483
–0.03447
0.723298
–0.40822
0.315081
0.58495
180
0.013909

0.00664
0.003336
0.012085
N/A
0.049361
0.002437
3.193497
–0.59526
0.40983
–0.23471
0.175119
1.454179
219
0.006574

0.008044
0.005023
0.007781
N/A
0.073826
0.00545
1.966064
–0.4839
0.523596
–0.27789
0.245706
1.73753
216
0.009901

–0.00138
0.002557
0.000256
N/A
0.033138
0.001098
2.123184
–0.43198
0.223996
–0.13501
0.088983
–0.23254
168
0.005048

0.0383
0.036648
0.004113
0.037841
0.538617
0.290108
212.2872
14.50723
8.168889
–0.28483
7.884057
8.272871
216
0.072236

0.00546
0.004755
0.008462
0.027852
0.069878
0.004883
1.843318
–0.70198
0.453631
–0.27757
0.176058
1.179259
216
0.009372

By looking at Table 2, different monthly performance for each index is observed. For instance, in
2016, all indices tested in this paper were underperforming with a loss in returns in January. By
December, indices were slightly recovering from

the loss. Another example is that in 2017, ADSM
was showing a low but positive return in January,
in the same year, by December, the return did not
show improvement, however, it took a turn to the
worst.

Table 2. Monthly returns on closing prices of GCC market indices (2000–2018)
Year
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000

66

Month
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December
January
December

ADSM

DFM

–4.37%
1.88%
–3.53%
0.66%
1.35%
1.66%
–1.70%
0.73%
–4.06%
1.89%
–1.04%
0.30%
0.84%
0.15%
–1.21%
1.51%
–1.17%
0.65%
–1.08%
–0.07%
–1.24%
1.45%
2.64%
–0.64%
–0.56%
0.94%
–0.31%
0.41%
0.69%
0.36%
–12.50%
0.55%
–2.11%
–0.13%
–
0.55%
–
–

–0.79%
2.37%
2.08%
0.72%
1.92%
0.32%
–1.89%
0.02%
–0.44%
1.29%
–0.26%
1.13%
0.16%
–0.40%
–0.62%
0.51%
–1.28%
0.54%
–1.32%
–0.37%
–2.03%
–0.19%
–4.49%
–1.16%
–0.62%
1.21%
–1.20%
0.20%
–0.34%
1.06%
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Daily returns on closing prices of GCC market indices
MSM30
SASEIDX
BHSEASI
KWSEIDX
–0.35%
–0.41%
–0.99%
1.03%
–4.83%
0.31%
3.90%
–0.70%
1.61%
2.02%
1.90%
0.27%
–0.19%
0.54%
–0.44%
0.28%
–0.24%
0.14%
–1.13%
0.22%
–0.57%
4.30%
–1.09%
1.10%
–0.29%
0.17%
–0.20%
0.05%
0.96%
1.29%
–1.77%
0.24%
2.80%
–0.21%
16.62%
1.10%
–
–0.59%

–0.77%
0.22%
–3.19%
–0.06%
–8.87%
–0.42%
1.03%
0.08%
–0.38%
–1.82%
–0.37%
0.18%
–2.85%
–0.03%
–1.09%
0.28%
–0.24%
0.06%
–0.88%
–3.36%
–0.81%
0.24%
–0.88%
–0.50%
–0.06%
1.68%
–1.19%
0.08%
–2.79%
0.89%
–0.73%
0.38%
–0.74%
0.34%
–0.04%
–0.16%
–
–

–1.17%
0.36%
–6.37%
1.95%
1.94%
0.58%
–0.98%
0.90%
–8.59%
0.74%
–6.90%
1.59%
–1.00%
–0.80%
–2.45%
–0.11%
–1.31%
0.33%
0.01%
0.66%
–0.06%
–0.84%
0.32%
0.79%
–0.15%
2.10%
1.23%
0.51%
–
0.54%
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

–2.71%
0.45%
0.86%
0.57%
0.65%
–0.09%
1.83%
0.04%
–1.83%
0.39%
–1.05%
0.11%
–1.85%
–0.22%
–1.35%
0.47%
–1.37%
–0.10%
–1.07%
0.27%
–2.09%
–2.69%
0.22%
0.40%
1.96%
1.06%
–1.10%
0.26%
–1.04%
0.38%
–0.92%
–0.60%
0.74%
0.32%
–1.48%
–0.04%
–0.25%
0.12%

DSM
0.81%
0.15%
–2.05%
–0.03%
1.01%
0.96%
–8.28%
–0.06%
–1.55%
–0.34%
–1.14%
0.11%
–8.99%
0.70%
–1.07%
–0.38%
–2.19%
0.20%
1.11%
–0.46%
1.92%
1.43%
2.38%
–1.21%
–0.64%
1.13%
–1.86%
0.90%
0.63%
0.01%
–0.08%
0.54%
–2.33%
–0.12%
–0.17%
0.42%
–
–
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GCC market returns
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Figure 1. GCC market performance for the period 2000–2018
Figure 1 depicts the annual performance of the
GCC stock market indices for the period under
study. In the period after 2008, returns are mostly
negative and the markets are more active.

2.1. Analysis of market returns
following positive and negative
January’s

Table 3 witnesses that the correlations of return between the GCC stock markets are not strong enough.
The strongest correlation is observed in the pairs of
Bahrain and Oman stock markets (0.804), Bahrain
and Kuwait (0.7787), and Kuwait and Abu Dhabi
(0.6259) stock exchanges. The correlation structure
for all other markets is not strong and especially for
Qatar with all other GCC exchanges. Specifically,
the lowest correlation coefficient is observed between the market returns of Abu Dhabi and Saudi
Arabia (0.0024). The correlation of returns between
the GCC stock indices shows a very weak trend
behavior in these markets. The structure of correlations between stock returns also shows that the
markets are not volatile.

This paper formally tests the statistical significance
of the January barometer by running a regression analysis using five different models generated from the general equation: yt +1 = a + bxt + e,
where yt+1 is the dependent variable, that is, the
11-month and 12-month period after January, xt is
the independent variable, that is, a dummy variable for January or the return of January, and e represents the error term. The regression equations
are estimated using (OLS)-based dummy variable
regression model as the standard approach in the
literature of capital market anomalies (Haugen &
Jorion, 1996; Arshad & Coutts, 1997; Mills et al.,
2000; Bohl & Salm, 2010). The standard errors are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals using the methods proposed

Table 3. Correlation structure in the GCC stock markets
ADSMI
ADSMI

DFM

MSM30

SASEIDX

BHSEASI

KWSEIDX

DSM

1

DFM

0.315252

1

MSM30

0.166867

0.470097

1

SASEIDX

0.002394

0.247549

0.440329

1

BHSEASI

0.475444

0.541177

0.803972

0.43984

1

KWSEIDX

0.625849

0.439054

0.582802

0.268314

0.778645

1

DSM

0.134305

0.388366

0.349172

0.374611

0.401006

0.403658
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by Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey and Breusch-Godfrey, With Model 2, we check over 12-month period the
respectively.
returns, where the dependent variable RtFebt − Jant +1
is the excess return from February to January of
The null hypothesis is that the spread in returns the following year.
between positive and negative January returns is
significantly different from zero. Slope coefficient Model 2
b was used as indicator for the spread following
(3)
Marshall and Visaltanachoti (2010)2. Therefore, if
RtFebt − Jant +1 =
a + bDtJant + et .
the slope coefficient is positive and significantly
different from zero, this is an evidence support- We observe the same results as in Model 1 where
ing OJE, as this would indicate the eleven months b is positive in most markets, but statistically in(Model 1) or twelve months return (Model 2 and significant. Hence, the OJE hypothesis could not
Model 4), following a positive January return is sig- be supported.
nificantly larger than the eleven months or twelve
months return following a negative January return3. According to Stivers et al. (2009), using a dummy variable as in Model 1 or Model 2 could cause
Model 1
much formation included in the January returns
to be lost. Therefore, we estimate Model 3, where
(2) instead of the dummy variable D, we use the reRtFeb − Dec =
a + bDtJan + et ,
turns of January, which capture all the return inwhere the dependent variable RtFeb − Dec is the 11 formation included in the January returns4.
month return from February to December in year t
for the respective country, DtJan is a January dum- Model 3
my variable, which has value 1 if the January return
(4)
in year t for the respective country is positive and
RtFeb − Dec =
a + bRtJan + et .
has value 0 otherwise. A statistically significant and
different from 0 coefficient of the dummy variable Under this model specification, a significant and
implies that January stock returns predict the re- positive b would indicate that the subsequent
turns in the following eleven months. The analysis eleven months return varies positively with the
is performed on all seven markets and the results January return for the respective country, which is
for Model 1 are reported in Table 4 along with the another way of describing the January barometer.
p-values. The findings show that b (the spread pa- Even in this model specification, the results are
rameter) is positive and statistically significant only not conclusive for the markets in GCC. Positive
for the market of Kuwait. In general, coefficients are and statistically significant slopes are observed for
not statistically significant point estimates and half the stock markets of Dubai and Kuwait, but for
of them do not have the theoretically expected signs. none of the other markets.
This implies that the hypothesis that the OJE has
predictive power for the returns in the subsequent
eleven months for all the GCC exchanges cannot be supported, with the only exception of the
Kuwait Stock Exchange. This finding is in agreement with the results obtained in Al-Saad (2004).
2
3

In order to test whether OJE has any predictive
power over the following 12-month period, we
are using the strategy of holding long (short)
position for 12-months following positive (negative) January’s (Marshall & Visaltanachoti,
2010).

Marshall and Visaltanachoti (2010) showed that the “simple spread” method from Cooper et al. (2006) is inaccurate.
Investors interpret the OJE based on raw returns rather than on excess returns. Therefore, in this study, we use the raw returns. Continuously
compounded excess return is also applied:

 I  
i 
= ln  t −ln1+
Excess return
 ⋅100,
 It −1   12⋅100  
4

68

where is the value of the index at time t, i is the risk-free rate, and ln(x) is the natural logarithm of x, but the results did not vary significantly.
It should be noted that in the case of Model 3, the b coefficient cannot be interpreted, as the spread because the value of the January returns
is not either 1, in case of a positive January return, or 0, otherwise.
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Table 4. Estimated parameters
Model 1
Country Sample
period Constant OJE

Model 2
Constant OJE

Model 3
Constant OJE

Model 4
Constant OJE

Constant

Model 5
OJE

Hall

Abu
Dhabi

2002–
2018

0.00347

0.011589 –0.269259 0.392572 0.009659 0.071892 –0.207165 1.546905 0.000192 0.071892 0.018933

(0.7445)

(0.4042)

2004–
2018

0.00083 –0.001704 0.210386 –0.321553 –0.001539 0.013133 2.571822 1.709809 –0.003475 0.014335 0.003877

Bahrain

2004–
2018

0.000683 –0.002809 –0.067137 0.358281 0.004181 0.170361 0.061857 1.590373 0.008704 0.003115 -0.0015

Dubai

Kuwait

2001– –0.006906 0.017523 –0.403824 0.598878 0.004406 0.107076 –0.036069 5.782985 0.001037 0.007565 0.013346
2018
(0.1927) (0.0017)* (0.7593) (0.7141) (0.1612) (0.039)* (0.954) (0.6901) (0.8229) (0.8886) (0.345)*
2001–
2018

0.003567 0.425854 –0.620068 0.956647 0.281762 1.176087 –0.019607 8.734712 0.00041 –0.000444 –0.00082

Oman

2001–
2018

0.006112 –0.001716 –0.076838 0.199643 0.009459 0.073164 0.129968 5.275321 0.007796 0.073164 0.003326

Qatar
Saudi
Arabia

2001–
2018

0.002865 0.009294

–0.6867 1.183308 0.008563 0.019904 0.01786 2.328199 –0.001721 0.050056 0.019333

(0.4898)

(0.6713)

(0.8531)

(0.9368)

(0.9942)

(0.0000)

(0.7558)

(0.8723)

(0.4796)

(0.2270)

(0.1297)

(0.8628)

(0.8998)

(0.9668)

(0.9419)

(0.9386)

(0.8526)

(0.8886)

(0.8952)

(0.9262)

(0.9103)

(0.6042)

(0.0726) (0.3476) (0.8512)

(0.5349) (0.8348) (0.0943)

(0.5443) (0.554)* (0.9620)

(0.3272) (0.8201) (0.9966)

(0.0828) (0.4124) (0.8782)

(0.0156) (0.7594) (0.9847)

Model 4
RtFebt − Jant +1 =
a + bRtJan + et .

(0.7738)

(0.9604)

(0.9230)

(0.9204)

(0.7264)

(0.9079)

(0.9807)

(0.3075)

(0.000)

(0.9938)

(0.2467)

(0.6822)

(0.3356)

(0.8201)

(0.8345)

(0.9995)

(0.417)

(0.1875)

(0.4053)

(0.5153)

(0.9913)

(0.7295)

(0.4234) (0.0017)*

the Halloween index. Thus, the January effect may
be simply the Halloween effect in disguise.
(5)

Here we run the same regression as in Model 2,
but with independent variable RtJan instead of D.
However, it is not supported in the GCC markets.
Another area of interest is the interaction of different calendar anomalies, addressed by Jacobs and
Levy (1988). A market anomaly recently investigated is the Halloween anomaly, which amounts
to a “sell in May and go away” strategy (Bouman &
Jacobsen, 2002). Here also the empirical evidence
found mixed results in international markets
(Maberly & Pierce, 2004). It is possible that investors who did not invest in a positive January-year
will buy in November following the Halloween
index and, thus, the January effect may be simply the Halloween effect in disguise. In Model
5, we investigate whether the OJE is simply the
Halloween effect in disguise. That is, we test the
case that possibly the investors who do not follow
the OJE strategy will buy in November following

Model 5
RtFeb − Dec =
a + b1 RtJan + b2 HallDt + et .

(6)

Since the predictive power of January might be related to other variables and phenomena or market
anomalies, a test of the independent vector as the
Halloween market anomaly is applied. According
to this effect, returns for May to October are significantly lower than for the rest of the year. Hence,
the Halloween indicator variable HallDt takes the
value 1 for each month from November to April
and 0 for the remaining months. If b2 is significant
and b1 is not, it would state that the Halloween effect is causing the January effect. The results are
presented in Table 4 and show that the Halloween
effect is not related to the predictive power of
January. We observe that for the markets of Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, b2 is significant and b1 is not
confirming the hypothesis that the Halloween effect is causing the OJE in these markets.

CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is to empirically test whether the January barometer has a predictive power
over the remainder of the year in the GCC stock exchanges. The results obtained indicate that January
anomaly does not have a predictive power in all stock exchanges sampled in this study. While there are
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markets in which the traditional January effect continues to exist, there seems to be a worldwide tendency for it to steadily break. It was also observed that there was an inverse result when it came to comparing the returns of January to that of December, where returns were lower in January than in other
months. Our results do not confirm the January anomaly in the GCC stock exchanges. Considering this
evidence, one has to conclude that the other January effect is not an international phenomenon and that
the existence and power of the January barometer varies between the stock markets.
In fact, some evidence is found for the Kuwait stock market, which confirms previous reported findings
(Al-Saad, 2004) and for the Dubai Stock Exchange. However, for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, we provide
an additional explanation that the January effect may be the Halloween effect in disguise.
Market anomalies and calendar effects is an open agenda in market finance literature and much work
is to be done. The present paper provided evidence against the other January effect in 7 countries of
the Gulf region. As a future work and for further examining the robustness of the findings, one has to
consider macroeconomic and market variables such as dividends and interest rates. Also, relating to the
geographic area studied in this paper, of great interest would be to check the predictive power of January
by using region’s Muslim calendar5. Finally, the advance of a “buy and sell” strategy following January
anomaly would be of great interest for investors.
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